GOP-led report debunks Benghazi theories.

kilofoxtrot

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"An investigative report prepared by the House Intelligence Committee finds little to support questions raised about CIA actions on the ground in Benghazi, Libya, the night of a deadly 2012 attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound.

The final report, from Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Michigan, and ranking member Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger, D-Maryland, concludes there was no intelligence failure prior to the attack, no stand-down order to CIA operatives trying to go assist at the besieged consular building and found conflicting intelligence in the wake of the attack about the motive and cause, which were reflected in early public comments by the administration."
 

kilofoxtrot

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http://www.foxnews.com/politics/interactive/2014/11/21/house-report-on-benghazi-attack/

Fair and Balanced reporting from Fox News

Executive Summary Reads:

ExecutiveSummary

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI” or “the Committee”)
conducted acomprehensive and exhaustive investigation into the tragic attacks against two US.
facilities in Benghazi, Libya on September 11-12, 2012. The nearly two-year investigation focused on
the activities of the Intelligence Community (“1C”) before, during, and after the attacks. Duringthe
course of thousands of hours of detailed investigation,HPSCIreviewed thousands of pages of
intelligence assessments, cables, notes, and emails; held 20 Committee events and hearings; and
conducted detailed interviews with senior intelligence officials and eyewitnesses to the attacks,
including eight security personnel on the ground in Benghazi that night.

This report details the findings and conclusions of HPSCI’s investigation. In summary, the
Committee first concludes that the CIA ensured sufficient security for CIA facilities in Benghazi and,
without arequirement to do so, ably and bravely assisted the State Department on the night of the
attacks. Their actions saved lives. Appropriate U.S. personnel made reasonable tactical decisions that night, and the Committee found no evidence that there was either a stand down order or a denial of available air support. The Committee, however, received evidence that the State Department security personnel, resources, and equipment were unable to counter the terrorist threat that day and required CIA assistance.

Second, the Committee finds that there was no intelligence failure prior to the attacks. In the
months prior, the IC provided intelligence about previous attacks and the increased threat environment
in Benghazi, but the IC did not have specific, tactical warning of the September 11 attacks.
Third, the Committee finds that amixed group of individuals, including those affiliated with Al‑
Qa’ida, participated in the attacks onUS.facilities in Benghazi, although the Committee finds that the
intelligence was and remains conflicting about the identities, affiliations, and motivations of the
attackers.

Third, the Committee finds that amixed group of individuals, including those affiliated with Al‑
Qa’ida, participated in the attacks onUS.facilities in Benghazi, although the Committee finds that the
intelligence was and remains conflicting about the identities, affiliations, and motivations of the
attackers.

Fourth,the Committee concludes that after the attacks, the early intelligence assessments and the
Administration’s initial public narrative on the causes and motivations for the attacks were not fully
accurate. There was a stream of contradictory and conflicting intelligence that came in after the attacks.
The Committee found intelligence to support CIA’s initial assessment that the attacks had evolved out of
aprotest in Benghazi; but it also found contrary intelligence, which ultimately proved to bethe correct
intelligence. There was no protest. The CIA only changed its initial assessment about aprotest on
September 24, 2012, when closed caption television footage became available on September 18,2012
(two days after Ambassador Susan Rice spoke), and after the FBI began publishing its interviews with
US officials on the ground on September 22, 2012.

Fiflh,the Committee finds that the process used to generate the talking points HPSCIasked
for‐and which were used for Ambassador Rice’s public appearances‐was flawed. HPSCIasked for
the talking points solely to aid Members’ ability to communicate publicly using the best available
intelligence at the time, and mistakes were made in the process of how those talking points were
developed.

Finally, the Committee found no evidence that any officer was intimidated, wrongly forced to
sign a nondisclosure agreement or otherwise kept from speaking to Congress, or polygraphed because of
their presence in Benghazi.
The Committee also found no evidence that the CIA conducted unauthorized
activities in Benghazi and noevidence that the IC shipped arms to Syria.

This report, and the nearly two years of intensive investigation it reflects, is meant to serve asthe
definitive House statement on the Intelligence Community’s activities before, during, and after the tragic
events that caused the deaths of four brave Americans. Despite the highly sensitive nature of these
activities, the report has endeavored to make the facts and conclusions within this report widely and
publicly available sothat the American public can separate the actual facts from the swirl of rumors and
unsupported allegations. Only with a full accounting of the facts can we ensure that tragedies like the
one that took the lives of Ambassador Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty
never happen again.
 

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